# 1NR

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### Overview

#### Ontology must come first – one cannot say anything about what is without already having made assumptions about the is as such

Dillon 99 [Michael, “The Scandal of the Refugee: Some Reflections on the ‘Inter’ of International Relations and Continental Thought,” in *Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics*, eds. David Campbell and Michael Shapiro (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) pg. 97-99]

As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other-regional-modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate through the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or *aporia*, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock-innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making. While Certain continental thinkers like Blumenberg and Lowith, for example, were prompted to interrogate or challenge the modern’s claim to being distinctively “modern,” and others such as Adorno questioned its enlightened credentials, philosophers like Derrida and Levinas pursued the metaphysical implications (or rather the implications for metaphysics) of the thinking initiated by Kierkegaard, as well as by Nietzsche and Heidegger. The violence of metaphysics, together with another way of thinking about the question of the ethical, emerged as the defining theme of their work. Other, notably Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard, Baudrillard, and Bataille turned the thinking of Nietzsche and Heidegger into a novel kind of social and political critique of both the regimes and the effects of power that have come to distinguish late modern times; they concentrated, in detail, upon how the violence identified by these other thinkers manifested itself not only in the mundane practices of modern life, but also in those areas that claimed to be most free of it, especially the freedom and security of the subject as well as its allied will to truth and knowledge. Questioning the appeal to the secure self-grounding common to both its epistemic structures and its political imagination, and in the course of reinterrogating both the political character of the modern and the modern character of the political, this problematization of modernity has begun to prompt an ontopolitcally driven reappraisal of modern political thought.

#### The role of the ballot is to endorse the team with the best ontological relationship

#### Only a god can save us – We should read our possibilities as debaters ontologically and open ourselves up to the possibility of Being revealing itself to us non-technologiclly

Heidegger and Spiegel 66. “Heidegger, Der Spiegel Interview” Philosophy Today 20 (Whiter 1976): 267-284. Scanned from Gunther Neske & Emil Kettering (eds), Martin Heidegger and National Socialism, New York: Paragon House, 1990, pp. 41-66.

SPIEGEL: You apparently see, so you have expressed it, a world movement that either brings about or has already brought about the absolute technological state? HEIDEGGER: Yes! But it is precisely the technological state that least corresponds to the world and society determined by the essence of technology. The technological state would be the most obsequious and blind servant in the face of the power of technology. SPIEGEL: Fine. But now the question of course poses itself: Can the individual still influence this network of inevitabilities at all, or can philosophy influence it, or can they both influence it together in that philosophy leads one individual or several individuals to a certain action? HEIDEGGER: Those questions bring us back to the beginning of our conversation. If I may answer quickly and perhaps somewhat vehemently, but from long reflection: Philosophy will not be able to bring about a direct change of the present state of the world. This is true not only of philosophy but of all merely human meditations and endeavors. Only a god can still save us. I think the only possibility of salvation left to us is to prepare readiness, through thinking and poetry, for the appearance of the god or for the absence of the god during the decline; so that we do not, simply put, die meaningless deaths, but that when we decline, we decline in the face of the absent god. SPIEGEL: Is there a connection between your thinking and the emergence of this god? Is there, as you see it, a causal connection? Do you think we can get this god to come by thinking? HEIDEGGER: We cannot get him to come by thinking. At best we can prepare the readiness of expectation. SPIEGEL: But can we help? HEIDEGGER: The preparation of readiness could be the first step. The world cannot be what and how it is through human beings, but neither can it be so without human beings. In my opinion that is connected to the fact that what I call “Being,” using a traditional, ambiguous, and now worn-out word, needs human beings. Being is not Being without humans being needed for its revelation, protection, and structuring. I see the essence of technology in what I call the con-struct. This name, on first hearing easily misunderstood, points, if it is properly considered, back into the innermost history of metaphysics, which still determines our existence [Dasein] today. The workings of the con-struct mean: Human beings are caught [gestellt], claimed, and challenged by a power that is revealed in the essence of technology. The experience that humans are structured [gestellt] by some-thing that they are not themselves and that they cannot control themselves is precisely the experience that may show them the possibility of the insight that humans are needed by Being. The possibility of experience, of being needed, and of being prepared for these new possibilities is concealed in what makes up what is most modern technology’s own. Thinking can do nothing more than to help humans to this insight, and philosophy is at an end. SPIEGEL: In earlier times – and not only in earlier times – it was thought that philosophy was indirectly very effective (seldom directly), that it helped new currents to emerge. Just thinking of Germans, great names like Kant, Hegel, up to Nietzsche, not to mention Marx

, it can be proved that philosophy has had, in roundabout ways, an enormous effect. Do you think this effectiveness of philosophy is at an end? And when you say philosophy is dead, that it no longer exists are you including the idea that the effectiveness of philosophy (if indeed it ever existed) today, at least, no longer exists? HEIDEGGER: I just said that an indirect, but not a direct, effect is possible through another kind of thinking. Thus thinking can, as it were, causally change the condition of the world. SPIEGEL: Please excuse us; we do not want to philosophize (we are not up to that), but here we have the link between politics and philosophy, so please forgive us for pushing you into such a conversation. You just said philosophy and the individual can do nothing except... HEIDEGGER: ... this preparation of readiness for keeping oneself open to the arrival or absence of the god. The experience of this absence is not nothing, but rather a liberation of human beings from what I called the “fallenness into beings” in Being and Time. A contemplation of what is today is a part of a preparation of the readiness we have been talking about. SPIEGEL: But then there really would have to be the famous impetus from outside, from a god or whomever. So thinking, of its own accord and self- sufficiently, can no longer be effective today? It was, in the opinion of people in the past, and even, I believe, in our opinion. HEIDEGGER: But not directly.

#### We control the root cause - there is no end to technological thought and rationale – it will continue to find more destructive ways to control life and death, eradicating all value to life and making their impacts inevitable

Beckman 2k [Tad: Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences at Harvey Mudd College, “Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics,” http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html].

The threat of nuclear annihilation is, currently, the most dramatic and ironic sign of technology's "success" and of its overwhelming power; mass itself has been grasped as a standing-reserve of enormous energy. On the one hand we consider ourselves, rightfully, the most advanced humans that have peopled the earth but, on the other hand, we can see, when we care to, that our way of life has also become the most profound threat to life that the earth has yet witnessed. [(14)](http://thuban.ac.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html#N_14_) Medical science and technology have even begun to suggest that we may learn enough about disease and the processes of aging in the human body that we might extend individual human lives indefinitely. In this respect, we have not only usurped the gods' rights of creation and destruction of species, but we may even usurp the most sacred and terrifying of the gods' rights, the determination of mortality or immortality. The gods, it is true, have been set aside in our time; they are merely antiquated conceptions. The gods, it is true, have been set aside in our time; they are merely antiquated conceptions. The "withdrawal of the gods" is a sign of our pervasive power and our progressive "ego-centrism."**The human ego stands at the center of everything and, indeed, sees no other thing or object with which it must reckon on an equal footing. We have become alone in the universe in the most profound sense. Looking outward, we see only ourselves in so far as we see only objects standing-in-reserve for our dispositions.** It is no wonder that we have "ethical problems" with our environment because the whole concept of the environment has been profoundly transformed. **A major portion of the environment in which modern Westerners live, today, is the product of human fabrication and this makes it ever more difficult for us to discover a correct relationship with that portion of the environment that is still given to us. It is all there to be taken, to be manipulated, to be used and consumed,** it seems. But what in that conception limits us or hinders us from using it in any way that we wish? **There is nothing that we can see today that really hinders us from doing anything with the environment, including if we wish destroying it completely and for all time.** This, I take it is the challenge of environmental ethics, the challenge of finding a way to convince ourselves that there are limits of acceptable human action where the environment is involved. But where can we look for the concepts that we need to fabricate convincing arguments?

### Line by Line

#### They say states prevent participation. No impact. Our ev is based upon how they actually enframe the debate in terms of energy production.

### Perm

#### 1. Logically impossible – the alternative is to refrain from enframing the resolution in a particular way in order to avoid the concealing that is innate in technological thought. Their plan is a link, and the permutation necessarily involves defending their plan as a cite for interpreting energy policy.

#### 2. The permutation is just another link. Their attempt to “solve” the problem of the K through action is another example of technological thought that kills the alts momentum

Botha 3 (Department of Philosophy University of Pretoria, South Africa, “Heidegger, technology and ecology”, South African Journal of Philosophy (2003), Vol. 22 Issue 2, 165)

Attempts to force Heidegger's ideas into a frame work of action forget his intention of escaping the wilfulness inherent to the technological attitude. He tells us explicitly that “Human activity can never directly counter this danger. Hu man achievement alone can never banish it. But human reflection can ponder the fact that all saving power must be of a higher essence than what is endangered, though at the same time kindred to it” (Heidegger 1993:399). The question asked at the beginning of this article is therefore in appropriate in the con text of Heidegger's views on technology. Heidegger wants us to respond to the question “what shall we think?” rather than “what shall we do?” Thought must first save us from our typical modes of behaving, namely those oriented towards possessive mastery, before we can move to action. Heidegger tells us that “[t]hinking does not become action only because some effect issues from it or because it is applied. Thinking acts in so far it thinks. Such action is presumably the simplest and at the same time the highest, because it concerns the relation of Being to man” (Heidegger, 1993:217). In this sense, the question of what we should do in the face of the technological crisis we are experiencing today can only be meaningful in terms of what we should think. Trying to force Heidegger's work into an “ecological” frame - work of action might convert it into the very willing which it is trying to escape. In our time, the world will remain largely technological, but we can launch an incisive critique of technology that ex poses the hegemony of its present reign. From this the saving power could grow. Admittedly, Heidegger does not give us much in terms of a political programme for change in terms of action, but in view of his definition of technology, this is war ranted.

#### 3. There is no net benefit to the permutation. The reasons their impacts matter are ethical claims that are contingent on them winning that their ontology is good, which they haven’t. That’s our Dillon evidence.

#### 4. Subordination DA: Their ontology is tied to their 1AC. The directed, goal-oriented technology of the affirmative can’t be combined with the alt’s mystical approach. Permutation just leads to more subordination

Botha 3 Catherine Frances (Department of Philosophy University of Pretoria, South Africa, “Heidegger, technology and ecology”, South African Journal of Philosophy (2003), Vol. 22 Issue 2, 165.

We can say both “yes” and “no” to technology by having an attitude of releasement to ward things. In other words, although it is crucial to perceive the danger of our technological constructions lest they dominate us, it is unnecessary to reject them completely. The alternative to be coming slaves of our own machines is not simply to become their masters. The goal is to integrate technology within a bounded worldly dwelling no longer ordered by possessive mastery. The attitude required to free ourselves from possessive mastery and achieve an appropriate relation to technology is one of awaiting and receiving, openness and releasement. Releasement towards things and open ness to the mystery grant us the possibility of dwelling in the world in a different way: a way where the mood of home lessness has been dis placed. Until this occurs, our attempts to control the products of technology will only sustain our subordination to it. The irony is that the “freedom” that has been nurtured for two and a half millennia in the West has encouraged this technological servitude.

#### Link debate here.

#### The purposes and possibilities for energy generation are channeled through technological thinking; all Beings can be reduced to an energy source

O’Brien 4 (Mahon, Professor of Philosophy at University College, Cork, Ireland, “Commentary on Heidegger’s ‘The Question Concerning Technology,” Thinking Together. Proceedings of the IWM Junior Fellows' Conference, http://www.iwm.at/publ-jvc/jc-16-01.pdf)

It is a charge which many are wont to make and one which is facilitated by the widespread conviction that it is entirely reasonable to both bracket certain features of Heidegger’s thought with a view to reappropriating them or to distinguish be- tween Sein und Zeit and much of his subsequent work. 50 **With respect to the revelatory capacity of modern technology, Heidegger is not simply bemoaning the loss of the world of yesteryear in misty-eyed sentimentality, this is not a doleful, nostalgic essay – “there is no demonry of technology” to begin with. Rather Heidegger is trying to discover what the exclusive feature of modern technology is which distinguishes it essentially from earlier types. To recapitulate, the difference pertains to the way in which modern technology** reveals**, the manner in which it allows us, and seemingly** compels us, to view the world **we live in and the Earth we live on. 51 Where once a windmill relied on the wind for its operative success or lack of it, now energy is** unlocked **from air currents, “a tract of land is** challenged **into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit**.” 52 One might object that this is to ignore the various ways in which we tradition- ally, even in our capacity as agriculturalists, challenged the Earth to provide us with a bountiful harvest, a harvest which emerged through human manipulation and contrivance of a technological, though admittedly more primitive and rustic nature. Farmers reaped what they sowed, not what the Earth chanced to grant them through multiple windfalls. How then do we reconcile this claim with Heidegger’s thoughts on technology? That is, where do we draw the line between earlier manifestations of technology, with their concomitant attempt to provide for ourselves in a way that required our very own peculiar intervention, and the modern technological attitude toward the world? In a way, the question will always resist any attempt to demarcate things rigidly – there will always be a penumbra where it is not yet clear if the transition has already been made in any genealogical account. That is not to say however, that along a spectrum we cannot notice degrees of difference which ultimately resolve into a completely new type or kind – a categorically different thing which at one end of the spectrum is easy to set in relief against the other end. Of course, part of Heidegger’s strategy in this essay is to show that such problems stem from our inability to move out from under the shadow of Enframing and some of its more conspicuous offspring such as the instrumental definition of technology. With respect to agriculture for instance: The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order [be- stellte] appears differently than it did when to set in order still meant to take care of and maintain. The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In the sowing of the grain it places the seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon [stellt] nature. It sets upon in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. 53 **What Heidegger seems very much concerned with is this imposition on the Earth**, that the Earth is set upon in a way which is disturbing from the standpoint of the sheer scale of its intrusiveness, its lack of reverence for that which it dismantles. **We no longer are part of the Earth but look to exploit it as a resource rather than seeing it as our wonderful, at times numinous home. We disassemble the natural configuration and look to manipulate and to disintegrate until something is no longer the structural item it once was but is a collection of forces, reduced to nothing but energy and resource to be exhausted or stock-piled**. There is a difference, not just in degree or intensity here, but in kind – what is revealed through modern technology is very different from what is revealed through older, cruder methods of, among other things, agriculture. For instance, Heidegger would almost certainly insist that there are important differences between the revealing which occurs within traditional planting and harvesting and that which is undertaken in genetic engineering and scientific intensive farming. Another feature which Heidegger believes is unique to the setting-upon which obtains within the essence of modern technology is the fact that it stockpiles materials and resources: The coal that has been hauled out in some mining district has not been supplied in order that it may simply be present somewhere or other. It is stockpiled; that is, it is on call, ready to deliver the sun’s warmth that is stored in it. 54 The world around us is something that we view rather differently, Heidegger argues, than earlier peoples were given to perceive, our perceptual goggles, if you will, have radically different filtration systems.

#### Nuclear energy proves even humans become part of the standing reserve of resources to be consumed by the subject

Kinsella 7 Dr. William J. Kinsella 2007 (Heidegger and Being at the Hanford Reservation: Standing Reserve, Enframing, and Environmental Communication Theory; Environmental Communication Vol. 1, No. 2, November 2007, pp.194-217 Dr. William J. Kinsella is an associate professor at North Carolina State University. His work on nuclear energy communication has encompassed the areas of nuclear fusion, environmental cleanup across the US nuclear weapons complex, and commercial nuclear energy in US and global contexts.)

People, too, became part of the standing reserve of resources for plutonium production at Hanford. Farmers, ranchers, and Tribal members were displaced to make way for nuclear reactors, chemical processing plants, and new communities built to house the Hanford workforce (Harris, 1972; Hein, 2000). Regional residents, some living on the Indian reservations surrounding the Hanford nuclear reservation, found their cultures and environments drastically transformed (D’Antonio, 1993; Loeb, 1982). Innumerable ‘‘downwinders’’ and other neighbors were exposed to radioactivity from Hanford’s operations. Throughout the Cold War era, health, safety, and environmental concerns were routinely subordinated to production imperatives; in at least one episode, Hanford’s managers deliberately released large amounts of radioactivity into the atmosphere for experimental purposes (D’Antonio, 1993; Gerber, 1992; Kinsella, 2001; Kinsella & Mullen, 2007). Meanwhile, nuclear workers received few disclosures regarding the hazards that accompanied their daily tasks (Gerber, 1992; Hales, 1997). Hanford was only one setting for this massive assimilation by a system that comprised, by the end of the Cold War, ‘‘more than 300 scientific and industrial sites employing more than 650,000 people’’ (Taylor, Kinsella, Depoe, & Metzler, 2005, p. 366). The nuclear system enframed nature through calculated processes of uranium mining and enrichment, conversion of uranium to plutonium in reactors, and extraction of plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel. Those processes culminated in the forcible production of energy from uranium and plutonium in two direct attacks on human populations and over 1,000 explosive tests, some of which distributed fallout over vast regions. This huge organizational effort (cf. Rhodes, 1986, 1995) would not have been possible without the extension of the calculability principle into human resource management through increasingly rationalized methods of accounting, scheduling, and industrial planning. Thus, the dominant organizational paradigms of the early and mid-twentieth century, ‘‘scientific management’’ and ‘‘human resources,’’ facilitated the production of a standing reserve that encompassed both nature and people. An anecdote provided by the physicist Edward Teller (2001) illustrates the enormous scale of this program, and inadvertently, its Heideggerian character as a standing reserve. According to Teller, his colleague Niels Bohr was initially skeptical of the prospects for developing nuclear weapons, arguing in 1939 that their production would require ‘‘turning the whole country into a huge factory’’ (p. 186). Teller writes that upon arriving in the United States in 1943, Bohr concluded that the Manhattan project had done exactly that.

### Perm Non Comp

#### Our links are based 100% on their enframing and use of nuclear tech. That’s Kinsella. There are no noncompetitive parts.

### Double Bind

#### No double bind. Our alt is rejecting their enframing of the resolution whereby we rejecting their challenging forth. We avoid THEIR hollowing out of being by trying to prescribe meaning. This is a framing issue for this round only.

## T

#### They do not meet our interpretation. Their plan text says, The USFG “should declare its sole authority to regulate nuclear power generation in the United States”. This is in no way removing something that restricts production. They are at best effects topical whereby they result in states removing restrictions. That’s not a direct result of the aff. Also, they have no ev. saying that removing state regulations are actually restrictions on production.

#### The effects T arg is also a reason why they don’t meet their CI.

#### Pref our interp

#### Our interpretation sets a bright line -- if the words of the law mandate a limit on energy production, then it is topical to remove it. Avoiding subjective judging decisions is good for the exercise of jurisdiction. Also, any advantages based on removing restrictions would be extratopical, not reasons to vote aff.

#### Declaring sole authority to regulate Nuclear Power is an INCREASE in RESTRICTIONS because regulations are restrictions. This makes the topic bidirectional, which kills predictability.

#### T version The plan could as easily be implemented via the NRC declaring its authority and agreeing with and re-implementing state regulations. The topical version of the aff is to just have the NRC repeal state restrictions.

#### The affirmative is also extra topical—the NRC can’t declare sole authority, but it can repeal restrictions. Allowing this aff lets them claim artificially competitive add-ons like federalism—they should have to read evidence about how an NRC repeal of state statutes leads to their federalism advantage.

#### Prefer CI. Reasonability is arbitrary. Competing interps is the only way to have a measurable way of resolving claims of offensive.

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